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Abstract
This paper proposes methods for identifying indirect network effects
with dynamically optimizing consumers purchasing a durable hardware
good and associated software. We apply this model to a data drawn
from the DVD player and titles markets. We observe model-level
prices, sales and characteristics of DVD players and sales and avail-
ability of DVDs at the level of the month for 10 years. We augment
these aggregate data with household survey data on player holdings.
In our model, forward looking consumers buy possibly multiple DVD
players over time and benefit from the evolution of the titles market.
We address issues of clustering, spurious correlation and endogeneity.
1 Introduction
This paper proposes methods for identifying indirect network effects with
dynamically optimizing consumers purchasing a durable hardware good and
associated software. We apply these methods to data drawn from the DVD
∗We with to thank the NPD Group, ICR-Centris, Home Media Magazine, and the DVD
Release Report for help in securing data. Da Young Sin, Danny Chan, David Rapson,
Kathleen Nosal and Jonathan Smith provided excellent research assistance. We thank the
NET Institute for financial support, as well as NSF Grant SES-0551348.
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player and titles markets. We observe model-level prices, sales and charac-
teristics of DVD players and sales and availability of DVDs at the level of
the month for 10 years. We augment these aggregate data with household
survey data on player holdings. In our model, forward looking consumers
buy possibly multiple DVD players over time and benefit from the evolution
of the titles market. We address issues of clustering, spurious correlation
and endogeneity.
Our work builds on the literature that has considered the estimation of
network effects. The most successful of these papers focus on static environ-
ments and exploit cross-sectional variation in data (see Saloner & Shepard,
1995; Rysman, 2004; Ackerberg & Gowrisankaran, 2006; Gowrisankaran &
Stavins, 2004). 1 However, much of the motivation and impetus for studying
network effects has been with regards to product diffusion over time, usually
with high technology products. Addressing estimation in this environment is
the goal of this paper. A number of papers have taken on these issues before
us, studying for example the diffusion of video cassette recorders, compact
disc players, and video games. Early examples are Park (2004) and Ohashi
(2003) for VCRs and Gandal, Kende & Rob (2000) for CD players. 2 These
papers do not address several issues that we view as important. Typically,
these papers use static demand models even though the goods in question
are durable. While a few papers have a dynamic interpretation, they do
not address the time series feature of the data or do not account for the
mismatch between a dependent variable that varies cross-sectionally and an
independent variable that varies only in the time-series.
Arguably, the closest paper to ours is Lee (2008), which like us specifies a
dynamic model of demand for hardware (in this case, video game consoles).
Lee differs from us in that he also specifies a structural model of demand
for the complementary good, video games. This setup is appropriate for the
questions of interest in the paper, which center around exclusive dealing.
However, the strong assumptions on the software side of the market preclude
flexibly studying the time series structure of the data in the way we envision,
and Lee does not directly address the endogeneity of the two markets. Also,
1More recent examples of explicitly static demand systems with an element of positive
feedback loops are Fan (2009) for newspapers, Jeziorski (2009) for radio stations and
Rysman (2007) for payment cards. An important early citation on newspapers is Rosse
(1970).
2There is now a relatively large literature estimating models of diffusion in markets
with indirect network effects. A partial list of more recent examples is Clements & Ohashi
(2005), Derdenger (2009), and Corts & Lederman (2009) for video games, and Nair, Chin-
tagunta & Dube (2004) for personal digital assistants.
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Inceoglu & Park (2004) and Park (2008) provide earlier attempts to address
time series issues in DVD diffusion.
At this stage, our results are highly preliminary and frankly, not very
supportive of our basic hypotheses. We present our these preliminary results
and discuss potential issues that we hope to address in the near future.
2 Overview
We identify four important econometric problems with estimating network
effects in a dynamic durable-goods environment, and then we propose meth-
ods for addressing these problems. The issues are as follows:
1. Dynamics: An appropriate model recognizes the dynamic nature of
consumer decision-making. Consumer choice is affected by the dura-
bility of the goods and the fact that consumers can wait until a future
date, and typically obtain similar quality for a lower price and realize
higher values of the complementary good.
2. Clustering: In most econometric analysis of markets with network ef-
fects, we observe a panel of hardware products but we have only limited
variation in the measure of the complementary good. For instance, if
we believe sales of DVD players are affected by the number of titles
available, we may observe sales for 200 players in a month but the
number of titles varies only in the time series. If we are comparing
DVD sales to VCR sales, perhaps we observe two measures of titles
per period but the issue remains largely the same.
3. Spurious correlation: Under almost any diffusion process, we would
expect sales of DVD players and DVD titles to increase over time even
if they did not have a causal relationship. Since sales of both are
correlated in time, a naive regression of one on the other will find a
positive coefficient and falsely conclude a causal relationship.
4. Endogeneity: Since sales of DVD titles and players are determined
simultaneously and endogenously, we expect any regression to exhibit
problems of endogeneity. For instance, an unobserved shock to the
demand for DVD players may lead movie producers to introduce more
DVD titles, creating reverse causality in our estimation equation. 3
3To clarify, we view spurious correlation and endogeneity as separate and distinct
problems. For instance, sales of Commodore 64 computers and mini-vans exhibit spurious
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We propose a method that addresses these four issues. In order to ad-
dress the first problem, we use a structural dynamic model of consumer
behavior. In particular, we adapt the model of Gowrisankaran & Rysman
(2009) to our context. Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2009) allows for persis-
tently heterogeneous consumers to purchase one of the available products
or wait based on rational expectations about the future evolution of mar-
ket characteristics. The model is designed to be applied to aggregated data
such as ours and allows for endogenous prices and changes in the number
of products over time. We adapt the model to allow for a complementary
good and importantly for our purposes, to allow consumers to hold multiple
products, whereas Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2009) requires consumers to
hold no more than one unit of a product at a time.
To address the second problem (clustering), we recognize that it is akin
to the problem confronted in the treatment effects literature, in which re-
searchers often employ panels with thousands of households to study policy
changes that vary only across states. Moulton (1990) and Donald & Lang
(2007) show that common state-time shocks make the proper construction
of standard errors challenging in this context. Donald & Lang (2007) rec-
ommend estimating with state-time dummies in a first stage and then re-
gressing the dummies on the policy variables in the second stage, and show
that although the second stage has many fewer observations than the first,
it actually gives the correct standard errors.
Our approach is analogous. Since our concern is with a “policy” variable
that varies only in the time series, we introduce time dummy variables. As
we show formally below, the month dummies can be interpreted as the ex-
pected current and future network benefits to a consumer at a given time,
plus any other features that vary only in time. Importantly, we construct
our structural model so that the addition of month dummies does not sig-
nificantly increase the computational time of our model. Because titles, and
hence expectations about current and future titles, vary only over time and
not cross-sectionally, the time dummies in our model capture the comple-
mentary goods part of utility.
Thus, the structural model is a “first stage” in our estimation procedure,
designed to provide us with a set of coefficients on time dummies. In our
“second stage”, we regress this sequence of dummy variable coefficients on
variables from the titles market using standard time series techniques. Note
correlation. They were introduced at similar times and growing sales over time, although
there was no endogeneity between them. In contrast, endogeneity could be realized in a
purely cross-sectional data set, but not spurious correlation.
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that this second stage will have many fewer observations than the structural
estimation. This two-stage approach generates appropriate standard errors
for the relationship between the titles and player market, following Donald
& Lang (2007). It also allows us to deal with the third problem, spurious
correlation. The second stage is a purely time series regression so we can
incorporate standard tools from time series econometrics to address spurious
correlation. We test for integration and heterogeneity of various orders and
in particular, cointegration between the time dummy coefficients and titles
variables. There is a growing recognition that time series issues should play
an important role in microeconometric studies, and this paper contributes to
that stream of research (see Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan, 2004; Angrist
& Pischke, 2009).
The fourth issue is endogeneity. We turn to the feature film market to
provide instruments. At least early in the product life when DVD sales
were relatively small, activity in the film market can be characterized as
exogenous to the DVD market. Chiou (2008) shows that the time period
between a film’s introduction and the release of a DVD varied between 4 and
6 months over our time period, and we have independent data to study this.
Hence, intuitively our instrumenting assumption is that if we see sales of
DVD players shifting up 4 to 6 months after a big weekend at the box office,
we assume that this is happening through the titles market and is evidence
of a network effect. That is, the box office affects titles but is otherwise
excluded from affecting the player market.
Our goal is to be very flexible about the way that the titles market might
affect the player market. An advantage of our approach is that the only
computationally expensive step is the structural first stage. The step we wish
to be flexible in, the relationship between the time dummy coefficients and
the variables capturing the titles market, is computationally cheap. Not only
can we try many forms of time series processes, but we can also experiment
with different summary statistics from the titles market. A common question
in this literature is about the appropriate measure of activity in the titles
market: Is what matters sales of titles, the number of titles, the presence
of a big hit or multiple big hits? Since we have data on each of these
variables and specifications are computationally cheap – and yet consistent
with dynamic optimization – we can explore all of these.
Overall, estimation of network effects models in the canonical dynamic,
durable goods setting presents serious econometric challenges. We propose
a polyglot method, drawing on ideas from structural micro-econometrics,
treatment effects, time series and instrumental variables to address these
problems. Our method addresses each of the important problems that we
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have identified and allows the researcher a great deal of flexibility in studying
the role of network effects.
3 Data
Our data set is drawn from a variety of sources. The centerpiece comes from
the NPD Group and contains monthly level observations on price and sales
for DVD players, at the level of the model. We have data from March 1997
to October 2006, a long panel that reaches back to what was essentially the
start of the industry. These data are drawn from relationships that NPD
has with a large set of consumer electronics retailers, but unfortunately does
not include WalMart or on-line sales.4 For each model, we collected charac-
teristics by hand based on web searches. For DVD players, characteristics
are typically dummy variables for features, such as progressive scan or DTS
audio capability. We also collected volume and weight although we restrict
ourselves to console DVD players, as opposed to portable DVD players so
this should be less important. We do not have data on other items, such as
personal computers, that also have DVD capability.
Figure 1 shows the number of models that appear in our data each
month over time. The growth in the number of products is startling. We
observe 9 products in the first month of the data, which increases almost
monotonically to show more than 350 products throughout 2006. Figure 2
shows sales (in units) by month. Like many consumer electronics products,
a great deal of sales of DVD players takes place during the holiday shopping
season in the fourth quarter. Conditional on that, DVD sales climb from
1997 to 2004. Interestingly, sales level off and begin to decline after 2004.
That is, we observe a sort of maturation of the DVD market in our data set.
Prices make a dramatic decline. Figure 1 graphs the sales-weighted average
price normalized to 2000 dollars. It reaches a high in the third month of
data at $766.30 and drops just below $100 in the final year of data.
DVD players are only useful with DVDs. We have obtained a monthly
time series from January 2001 to September 2008 on sales of pre-recorded
DVDs from the Research Department of Home Media Magazine, which
uses information from Nielson VideoScan. Like NPD, Nielson’s informa-
tion comes from relationships with retailers, but does not include WalMart.
In this case, Home Media infers WalMart sales based on their research. Fig-
4To be specific, NPD imputes sales at retailers that are not part of its survey, but does
not attempt to impute sales at WalMart or wholesale clubs such as Costco, or on-line
sales.
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Figure 1: Number of models by month
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Figure 2: Number of units sold by month and average price
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Figure 3: Sales of DVD titles by month
ure 3 graphs this time series. Similar to DVD players, the series exhibits
exaggerated holiday sales and a leveling off of sales growth around 2004.
The titles data overlaps with our player data from six years, from 2001 to
2006. We have also obtained data on counts of the number of available titles.
In fact, we have a comprehensive data set on the release date of each title,
as well as some characteristics such as genre. Hence, we know not only the
number of DVD titles but their identity.
Sales of DVD titles are likely to be endogenous to sales of DVD players.
As an instrument, we use outcomes from the cinema release market. We
have obtained box office revenue and the number of movies released from
Box Office Guru, an on-line source of movie information. We observe weekly
data from the last week of 1995 to the 7th week of 2008. Figure 4 displays
this variable. It is highly variable from week to week and displays less
seasonal variation than the other variables.
Finally, households that make multiple purchases play an important role
in our model. However, it is questionable whether one can infer the preva-
lence of multiple purchases from aggregate data on sales. To make progress,
we use a data set from Centris of ICR, a market research firm. Centris
performs a telephone survey based on random digit dialing of consumer
holdings of consumer electronics. They complete about 4,000 surveys per
month. They specifically ask each household how many console DVD play-
ers they hold, and they report the percentage of households that hold 0, 1,
2 or more than 2 console players. We obtained data for the third quarter
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Figure 4: Box office revenue for films by week
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Figure 5: Number of DVD players in a household among those that have at
least one
of each year from 2000 to 2006. That data appears as a stacked line chart
in Figure 5. Among households that have at least one DVD player, 87.9%
have only one in 2000. This number drops to 56% by 2006, with the number
reporting that they have more than 2 climbing from less than 2% to 14.3%.
4 Structural Model
Here, we present our model of consumer demand that allows us to account for
the issues we describe above. The model builds on Gowrisankaran & Rysman
(2009) by extending it to allow for complementary goods and for households
to hold multiple products. Our model starts with the introduction of a new
consumer durable good at time t = 0. The unit of observation is a month
and there is a continuum of heterogeneous potential consumers indexed by
i. Consumers have infinite horizons and discount the future with a common
factor β. Consumer i chooses one of among Jt products in each period t or
chooses to purchase no product in the current period. From these Jt + 1
choices, the consumer chooses the option that maximizes the sum of the
expected discounted value of future expected utilities conditional on her
information at time t.
Product j at time t is characterized by observed characteristics xjt, price
pjt, an “environmental variable” Nt and an unobserved (to the econometri-
cian) characteristic ξjt. For DVD players, observed characteristics include
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the presence of advanced sound and display features such as Dolby audio
and progressive scan. In our context, the environmental variable describes
the title market, for instance the number of titles available at time t. The
environmental variable that the consumer obtains from purchase is allowed
to change over time. We assume that consumers and firms know all time t
information when making their time t decisions. The additional flow utility
to consumer i who purchases product j in period t is:
uijt = xjtαxi − αpi pjt + θNt + ξjt + εijt
Here, εijt is distributed independently across consumers, products and time
according to the Type I Extreme Value distribution, creating the familiar
logit demand system. Consumers know only their current set of εijt, not
future values. Consumers are characterized by their demand parameters
αi = {αxi , αpi }, which stay constant over time.
Now we turn to the dynamics of our problem. We assume that products
are infinitely durable. Let δfijt = xjtα
x
i + ξjt, the permanent part of the
flow utility (we use the superscript f to refer to flow utility). Consumer i
who purchases product j in period t receives δfijt+ θNτ in all periods τ > t.
Notice that the value of the environmental variable can change over time
whereas the value of δfijt cannot. Let δ
0f
it be the accumulated flow utility
from all products the consumer has purchased up to time t (as in GR, we
use the superscript 0 to represent the quality of the consumer’s holdings):
δ0fit =
t−1∑
τ=1
Jt∑
j
δfijτ1{dijτ = 1}
where dijτ = 1 if consumer i bought product j in time τ , and 1{.} is an
indicator function.
Also, we allow for declining marginal value from holding multiple goods.
Let ψˆn to be a discount to utility for holding n goods. 5 Let Ωt denote the
state of the market, which is made up of current product attributes and any
other factors that influence future product attributes. We assume that Ωt+1
evolves according to some Markov process P (Ωt+1|Ωt) that accounts for firm
optimizing behavior. Thus, the relevant state variables for the consumer are
the number of players a consumer holds, nit, their accumulated quality δ
0f
it ,
the draws εi.t and the state of the market, Ωt. The Bellman equation is:
V (δ0fit , nit,Ωt, εi.t) = max
5There is an important assumption in this statement, which is that the decline does
not depend on the flow utility of the products that the consumer holds. We return to this
point below.
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max
j=1,...,Jt
δ0fit +δ
0f
ijt+(nit+1)θNt+ψ˜nit+1+εijt+βE
[
V
(
δ0fit+1, nit + 1,Ωt+1, εi.t+1
)
|δ0fit , nit,Ωt, εi.t
]
,
(1)
δ0fit +nitθNt+ψ˜nit+εi0t+βE
[
V
(
δ0fit+1, nit + 1,Ωt+1, εi.t+1
)
|δ0fit , nit,Ωt, εi.t
]
(2)
Line 1 represents the value of buying and line 2 represents the value of not
buying.
The value function V (δ0fit , nit,Ωt, εi.t) is too large for us to work with
numerically, so we use various techniques to simplify it. First, note that
δ0fit and nitθNt enter both the value of buying and the value of not buying.
Thus, we can subtract them from both values and write a decision problem
that generates the same purchase decisions as the original problem. This
step eliminates the state variable δ0fit . Furthermore, subtract ˆψn+1 from
both problems and let ψn = ψˆn − ψˆn+1. Then we have:
V (nit,Ωt, εi.t) = max
max
j=1,...,Jt
δfijt + θNt + εijt + βE [V (nit + 1,Ωt+1, εi.t+1) |nit,Ωt, εi.t] ,
ψnit + εi0t + βE [V (nit + 1,Ωt+1, εi.t+1) |nit,Ωt, εi.t]
In words, flow utility from products the consumer already holds does not
affect future decision-making. A critical assumption to get this result is that
ψn depends only on the number of products, not δ
0f
it . It is restrictive, but
greatly simplifies our computational problem. Similarly, we rule out that
ψn depends on Nt, so it affects decision-making only to the extent that it
affects the value of purchasing a new good. Thus, consumers care only about
the number of DVD players they hold, not the characteristics of those DVD
players. It is as if consumers get these benefits “up front” at the time of
purchase, and afterwards, the consumer gets only the benefits of holding n
goods, captured by ψn. 6 Because we expect that ψˆn+1 < ψˆn, we expect
that ψn+1 > ψn.
Next, we note that because εi.t is iid, it satisfies the assumption of con-
ditional independence (Rust, 1987) and may be integrated out. We work
with EV (nit,Ωt), where:
EV (nit,Ωt) =
∫
ε
V (nit,Ωt, ε)f(ε)d
6This assumption is similar to one made in Hendel & Nevo (2006). They assume that
only the amount of laundry detergent a household holds affects dynamic decision making
but that brand characteristics still affect the household at the time of purchase.
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Finally, we turn towards simplifying Ωt. Define δ
f
it to be the expected
value of the flow utility (uijt) to consumer i that chooses among the products
available in period t. Because we have assumed logit errors, this expected
value takes on a convenient closed form, known as the inclusive value:
δfit = ln
 Jt∑
j=1
exp(δfijt − αpi pjt + θNt)
 . (3)
If a consumer knew current and future values of δfit, the consumer would
have enough information to optimally choose when to make her next pur-
chase. The consumer does not need to know Ωt, which simplifies the value
function. That is, nit, δ
f
it and the contingent path of δ
f
it are sufficient statis-
tics to define EVi (nit,Ωt). Formally,
EVi (nit,Ωt) = EVi
(
nit, δ
f
it, P
[
δfi,τ+1|Ωτ
])
. (4)
Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2009) and Melnikov (2001) prove this point for-
mally. This result follows from assuming the logit functional form for εijt
and does not require further assumptions.
Unfortunately, Equation 4 does not generate a numerical simplification
since consumers should still predict future values of δfit using all of Ωt. In
order to make progress, we make an important simplifying assumption on
how consumers make predictions. In particular, we assume that consumers
use only the current value of δfit to predict Ωt. Following Gowrisankaran
& Rysman (2009), we refer to this as the assumption of Inclusive Value
Sufficiency.
Assumption 1 Inclusive Value Sufficiency (IVS)
If two states Ωt and Ω′t generate the same value of δ
f
t , then Pi
(
δfit+1)|Ωt
)
=
Pi
(
δfit+1)|Ω′t
)
for all t and Ωt, Ω′t.
The assumption of IVS implies that all states with the same nit and δ
f
it
have the same continuation value, and so Ωt become unnecessary. Thus,
the state space is reduced to two dimensions. The IVS assumption can be
interpreted as an assumption that consumers are boundedly rational and
use only a subset of the data potentially available to them in forming their
predictions. The assumption is restrictive. For example, δfit could be high
either because there are many products in the market all with high prices
or because there is a single product in the market with a low price. While
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dynamic profit maximization might lead these two states to have different
patterns of industry evolution, consumers in our model will lump them into
the same state.7
For our specifications we assume that consumer i perceives Pi
(
δfi,t+1|δfit
)
as its actual empirical density fitted to a simple functional form and use a
simple linear autoregressive specification,
δfi,t+1 = γ1i + γ2iδ
f
it + νit, (5)
where νit is normally distributed with mean 0 and γ1i and γ2i are inci-
dental parameters specific to each consumer i. By assuming that consumers
make predictions based on the parameters from (5) derived from the realized
values of δit, we are assuming that consumers have rational expectations,
conditional on the restriction in (5).
Note that our IVS assumption and Equation 5 are statements only about
exogenous items such as the current numbers of products, prices, and char-
acteristics. In this sense, our assumptions are more similar to those in
Melnikov (2001) and Hendel & Nevo (2006) than Gowrisankaran & Rysman
(2009). This follows from our model in which only the number of products
has dynamic content, not the characteristics of those products. This as-
sumption also makes computation much easier. Without this assumption,
the characteristics of the product would affect not only which product the
consumer chooses today but also future decision-making, and so must play a
role in the value function. Thus, Nt, the features of the titles market, would
affect the state of the consumers, which means we could not write the time
dummies as a linear function of mean utilities and we would have to search
over time coefficients non-linearly (for more on this, see Section 5), which
would be infeasible. Hence, the assumption that the value function depends
on the number of products held and not their characteristics generates a
major computational savings. We also believe it is a reasonable assumption,
but we discuss this more later.
An implication of (5) is that, for 0 < γ2i < 1, a graph of mean δ
f
it
against time finds a concave line with an asymptote that is approached
from below. This asymptote is important in our model since it represents
a steady state in the evolution of product characteristics that the consumer
expects to approach. The eventual arrival of a steady state is what allows
us to treat the consumer as facing a stationary environment, even though
observed choices are evolving quickly. In practice, we estimate 0 < γ2i < 1
7Hendel & Nevo (2006) and Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2009) provide a similar discus-
sion of the implications of Assumption 1.
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for all types i, and we find that consumers view the current value of δfit as
substantially below the asymptote, so that consumers believe the market is
improving for well after the time frame of our data set.
The logit assumption on εijt generates a convenient closed for solution
for the Bellman Equation that we exploit when solving the problem:
EVi
(
nit, δ
f
it
)
= ln
(
exp
(
δfit + βE
[
EVi(nit + 1, δ
f
it+1)|nit, δfit
])
+ exp
(
ψnit + βE
[
EVi
(
nit, δ
f
it+1
)∣∣∣nit, δfit])+ γ.)
Notice how our method casts the dynamic decision as a single binary
choice about when to buy, similar to an optimal stopping problem. Condi-
tional on buying, the consumer chooses what to buy, but we can abstract
away from this choice in the dynamic problem.
5 Inference
This section discusses the parametrization and estimation of the model. Our
methods for estimating the model follow closely those in Gowrisankaran &
Rysman (2009) and so we cover them only briefly here. Integrating over
consumers i does not generate a closed-form solution for the market shares
for products. Hence, we simulate consumers by drawing consumer devia-
tions. In practice, we assume that αi ∼ N(α,Σ), where Σ is non-zero only
on the diagonal of the matrix. We draw from the standard normal to rep-
resent consumer deviation from the mean and estimate α and Σ to create
each consumer’s αi.
We do not attempt to estimate β because it is widely understood to be
unidentified in dynamic decision models (see Magnac & Thesmar, 2002).
This is particularly true for our model, where substantial consumer wait-
ing can be explained by either little discounting of the future or moderate
preferences for the product. Thus, we set β = .99 at the level of the month.
For purposes of this section, we define mean utilities to consumers and
products:
δijt = xjtαxi − αpi pjt + θNt + ξjt
δjt = xjtαx − αppjt + θNt + ξjt.
Here, αx and αp are the mean values of αxi and α
p
i . Because δijt and δjt are a
flow utilities, they should be supercripted with “f” by our notation, but we
leave it off for simplicity. Because we can write α and ξjt as a linear functions
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of δjt, we can “concentrate out” α, as in Nevo (2000). Hence, our estimation
algorithm solves for δjt as a function of the remaining parameters Σ and ψn,
and then constructs moments of ξjt based on matrix algebra techniques,
so we search over only Σ and ψn. In estimation, the vector α includes a
set of time dummy coefficients. Being able to solve for the time dummies
coefficients in this way, as opposed to searching for them non-linearly, is
important since there are a great number of them.
For any given set of parameters Σ and ψn, we start with a guess of δjt.
Based on this, we construct individual flow utilities δijt using the draws
of consumer deviations from the mean. We then construct δfit based on
Equation 3. Then, we perform the AR(1) regression Equation 5 for each
consumer i separately, thereby recovering belief parameters γi. Because
we discretize the state space, we convert the parameters to a transition
matrix following Tauchen (1986). Then, for each consumer separately, we
guess a starting value for the value function and solve the Bellman equation
(Equation 4) by successive approximations.
Once we have value function EVi(nit, δ
f
it), we are ready to solve for condi-
tional and unconditional probabilities of purchase. Conditional probabilities
of purchase are as follows. For consumer i in period t who holds nit products
and faces a market with δfit, the probability of purchase is:
Pit(nit, δ
f
it) =
exp
(
δfit + βE
[
EVi(nit + 1, δ
f
it+1)|nit, δfit
])
exp
(
δfit + βE
[
EVi(nit + 1, δ
f
it+1)|nit, δfit
])
+ exp
(
ψnit + βE
[
EVi
(
nit, δ
f
i,t+1
)∣∣∣nit, δfit]) .
Conditional on purchasing in period t, consumer i picks product j with
probability:
Pij|t =
δijt∑Jt
k=1 exp(δikt)
.
In order to compute the unconditional probabilities, the market shares,
define the (T + 1) × (n + 1) matrix si for each consumer i. Here, T is the
number of periods in the data set, n is the maximum number of products a
consumer may hold, and si is the share of consumers of type i holding each
number of products at each period. We index si from 0 to T and from 0 to
n. We assume that for each i, the first element row is a vector of zeros, with
the first element being 1. That is, everyone holds zero products in period
0. 8 Then, we can use Pit to successively fill out each row of si. For instance,
8This is reasonable because our data set reaches back to what is essentially the onset
of the industry. For an alternative approach, see Schiraldi (2009) who estimates an initial
distribution in the used car market.
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si[1, 1] = 1−Pit(0, δfi1) and si[1, 2] = Pit(0, δfi1). 9 Because consumers cannot
buy more than one product in a period, sit[1, n] = 0 for n > 2. Element t, n
of sit is Pitsit[n− 1, t− 1] + (1− Pit)sit[n, t− 1], the sum of purchasers who
held n−1 products and non-purchasers who held n products in period t−1.
With these elements, we can compute market shares. The market share
predicted by the model of product j in period t is:
ŝjt =
ns∑
i=1
Pij|t
(
n∑
n=0
Pit(n, δ
f
it)si[t− 1, n]
)
.
Here, ns is the number of consumer types that we sample. That is, we
sum over each consumer type the set of consumers holding each number of
products in the previous period multiplied by the probability of choosing
product j.
We use the fixed point equation of Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (1995) to
generate a new guess for δjt. In vectors, where s0 is the observed data, δ is
the vector of elements δjt and ŝ(δ) is the resulting market shares:
δ′ = δ + ln(s0)− ln(ŝ(δ))
Thus, we iteratively compute δ until we find one that generates the observed
market shares. Although we cannot prove that there is a unique solution,
we have not had any problems with convergence. Gowrisankaran & Rysman
(2009) discusses this issue further.
Based on the resulting vector δ, we compute ξjt = δjt − (xjtαx − αppjt).
We can solve for ξjt using matrix algebra techniques as described in Nevo
(2000). We form moments with the resulting vector ξjt using instruments
zjt. Thus, our objective function is:(
αˆ, Σˆ, ψˆ
)
= argminα,Σ,ψ
(
z′ξ(α,Σ, ψ)
)′
W
(
z′ξ(α,Σ, ψ)
)
, (6)
where W is a weighting matrix. As is standard, we obtain GMM estimates
in two steps. We first set W = z′z, which is efficient under the assumption
of homoskedastic errors and generates consistent estimates, and then we
construct the efficient weighting matrix allowing for arbitrary heteroskedas-
ticity.
In practice, we draw 48 consumers (ns = 48). We discretize δit into 50
bins stretching from -40 to 0, which is much greater than the span of what we
9We use the notation si[l,m] to denote the element in row l and column m of matrix
si.
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observe in our model. We set the maximum number of products a household
can hold to 4 (n = 4). In our results, less than 2% of households hold four
DVD players at the end of the sample. We use importance sampling as
described in Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2009) to reduce sampling error. We
assume there are 100 million households in the United States during this
time period, although in practice this changes from about 95 million to 105
million. Incorporating a growing market is straightforward but we have not
done this yet.
We normalize ψ0 = 0 and ψ1 = 0 and parameterize
ψn = ψ(n− 1) for n > 1.
Normalizing ψ0 = 0 is the standard normalization in any discrete choice
model that one option must have zero utility. We normalize ψ1 = 0 because
it is collinear with the constant term.
In order to identify the ψ parameter, we incorporate micro-moments in
the spirit of Petrin (2002) and Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (2004). We do not
use the survey data to establish how many households have purchased, as
we are concerned that because our data set does not cover all retailers, it
may mismatch in this dimension. Instead, we use survey data to determine
holdings among households that hold at least one player. We use the ICR
survey mentioned above to identify 2 moments at 7 time periods for 14
moments: the percentage of households holding one console DVD player
amongst those holding a console DVD player annually from March 2000 to
March 2006, and the percentage holding two. The remaining households
hold three or more. We compute the equivalent moments by summing over
consumer types with the appropriate row of si. We include the difference
between the models predictions and the ICR data as moments, vertically
concatenated onto z′ξ in Equation 6. We expand the weighting matrix by
14 elements in each dimension. The diagonal elements of the weighting
matrix should be the inverse of the variance of the moment. For variance,
we use (p)(1− p)/4000, where p is the value of the moment in the data, and
4000 is the approximate number of households sampled in each period. As
this variance is very small, our weighting matrix puts a high weight on the
micromoments so our estimation algorithm attempts to match these very
closely.
We search using non-derivative methods such as the Nelder-Mead algo-
rithm and direct search techniques. All programs are available on request.
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5.1 Second Stage
Now consider θ. Rather than identify θ from the structural model, we iden-
tify θ from correlation between the month dummy coefficients and the ex-
ogenous variables representing the DVD titles and feature film markets. In
this second stage, we plan to consider complicated dynamic processes for
the coefficients and Nt and their relationship, apply appropriate tests for
co-integration and other issues and introduce instruments for Nt. Little is
known about how the titles markets affect player markets, and hence we
propose a model that allows allows maximum flexibility and low-cost spec-
ification searching over this issue while still capturing dynamic consumer
behavior appropriately over this durable and rapidly changing good. In the-
ory, whatever specification we find to be superior could be imposed in the
structural model and we could estimate θ in one step.
6 Results
In this section, we present the results of our model. Our results are pre-
liminary and, in some, respects, problematic. We discuss these issues and
propose some possible problems in our approach so far.
We estimate the model described above. At our estimated parameters,
our model predicts that less than 2% of consumers hold 4 DVD players so
we do not view this as a binding constraint. We set the discount rate to 0.9,
which is too low to reflect monthly discounting. Our current experiments
suggest that results do not change much as we increase the discount rate.
We plan to use a higher discount rate in our final version of the paper.
We include brand dummies in our model. In practice, we aggregate
brands with less than 70 observations (for instance, 5 models for one year
would be 60 observations) into a single brand. This aggregate brand still
accounts for less than 5% of the data.
Results appear in Table 1. We include several dummies for quality in
the linear specification of utility. They indicate whether the DVD player
has an S-video outlet, whether it can use the DTS sound standard, whether
it can play compact disks that use read or re-write states (CD-R and CD-
RW), whether the player can play MP3 files, whether it is ”dual” player
that can also play VHS tapes, whether it uses Progressive Scan technology
and whether it can record DVDs. We find all of the coefficients are positive
and significant.
We include in price in logs. Note that it is difficult to justify log price in a
utility function and most other similar papers use price in levels, for instance
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Constant 0.773 (1.411)
ln Price ‐2.251 (0.358)
S‐Video outlet 0.354 (0.051)
DTS sound capable 0.208 (0.050)
Plays CD‐R/RW 0.124 (0.032)
Plays MP3 0.584 (0.070)
Plays VHS 1.139 (0.085)
Uses Progressive Scan 0.891 (0.110)
Records to DVD 1.357 (0.238)
Random coefficient:
ln price 0.187 (0.118)
Psi 0.027 (0.106)
Observations 11,534
Table 1: Results from structural estimation
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Berry et al. (1995). However, logit based models can be interpreted as log-
linear models (see Berry, 1994), log independent variables seem natural, and
we find that price in logs seems to fit the data better. We plan to experiment
with price in levels as well. Logged price is negative and significant, with
a coefficient of -2.251. We allow for only one random coefficient, and this
is on price. We find a find a coefficient of 0.187, which is significant but
particularly large relative to the level price.
We estimate one coefficient ψ, which indicates how much the flow util-
ity increases each time a consumer adds a product. We find a value 0.027,
although it is imprecisely measured. This is a permanent flow, so it can
multiplied by 1/(1 − β) in order to compare to price. Thus, it is not eco-
nomically large. Note that in our model, this parameter is the only source
of dynamics.
Finally, we estimate time dummies. These appear in Figure 6. The most
striking aspect of the time dummies is their marked downward slope. That
contrasts with actual sales, which we know were increasing during this time.
We believe that a prime issue here is the rapid increase in the number of
products. Since the number of products increases faster than sales, sales
per product falls over time, which is what the time dummies match. Thus,
it will be important to include the number of products in a period as an
explanatory variable in our second-stage estimation.
Figure 6 also shows DVD revenue of this time. It displays the same
seasonality as the time dummies. Thus, it will be important to control for
the month of the year. By way of comparison, we also graph new DVD titles
against the time dummies in Figure 7.
Our second stage estimation appears in Table 2. The equation we esti-
mate is:
θt = β0 + β1θt−1 + β2 ln(Jt) + β3 ln(Nt) + β4Xt + ut
In this regression, θt is a time dummy coefficient from the first stage esti-
mation. Recall that Jt is the number of products available in a period. The
DVD title market is captured by Nt. We experiment with three variables
here, the number of new DVD titles, the number of new DVD titles asso-
ciated with cinema-released movies, and DVD revenue. The Xt variables
are other explanatory variables, which in particular are month-of-the-year
dummy variables. In some specifications, we instrument for ln(Nt). For an
excluded variable, we use the log of box office revenues from five months
previous.
First, consider the three specifications with out instruments, in the top
panel of Table 2. The autoregressive term is extremely large, greater than
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lag time coefficient 2.193 (0.079) 2.274 (0.079) 2.900 (0.268)
# of players (ln) 0.285 (0.155) 0.150 (0.125) 1.212 (0.474)
new DVD titles (ln) ‐0.495 (0.113)
new DVD movie titles (ln) ‐0.500 (0.111)
DVD revenue (ln) ‐0.344 (0.232)
lag time coefficient 2.292 (0.319) 2.181 (0.178) 5.499 (15.144)
# of players (ln) ‐1.641 (5.747) ‐0.765 (1.472) ‐0.241 (8.505)
new DVD titles (ln) 1.054 (4.621)
new DVD movie titles (ln) 0.451 (1.529)
DVD revenue (ln) 2.937 (19.112)
Obs.
In lower panel, we use Box Office Revenue (ln, 5 month lag) as an IV for DVD variables.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
115 115 70
Table 2: Second stage results: Time dummy coefficients as the dependent
variable
2 in each specification. The number of players is positive, which seems very
surprising given their strong negative correlation. The three variables of
interest, the measures of the titles market, all point the wrong way.
In contrast, results appear somewhat more as expected when we in-
strument for the titles market variables with box office revenue. In these
regressions, the number of players on the market has a negative effect on the
time coefficients. We believe that this is driven by simple arithmetic of sales
per player varying in the number of players, but it may also reflect crowd-
ing effects discussed in Ackerberg & Rysman (2005). In these regressions,
we find that the titles market has a positive effect on the time coefficients.
However, the effects are very imprecisely measured, and are not significant.
While at this stage, our results are not very compelling, we see several
paths to follow for continued work. Given our very small estimate of ψ,
we are finding that demand is essentially static. That seems unlikely, and
we plan on continued experimentation with the structural model to explore
this issue. Furthermore, our implementation of the second-stage time series
regression has so far been unsophisticated, and we believe that continued
explorations with more thoughtful specifications will yield the expected re-
sults.
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7 Conclusion
This paper proposes methods for estimating a network in a dynamic envi-
ronment. We address a series econometric issues that have not been well-
documented in the previous literature. Our (very) preliminary results do
not find an important network during the time period of our data.
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